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Abstract: With the rapid expansion of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in 
China over the last two decades, OFDI has become an increasingly important way of 
internationalization for firms. This paper documents how firms’ OFDI and its different 
patterns may affect their internal resource allocation efficiency by adopting PSM-DID method 
and using firm-level data of China. Our results show that China's OFDI significantly 
improves the overall efficiency of resource allocation within enterprises, which has a time lag 
effect. Furthermore, we find that different patterns of firms’ OFDI display significant 
heterogeneity in their performances. All results remain robust when we replace key variables 
with different indexes, change the matching method, recalculate parameter, and change the 
sample size. The key implication of the paper is that both the value and the pattern of OFDI of 
Chinese enterprises do have significant influences on its internal resource allocation. 
 
Keywords: Outward FDI; Foreign Direct Investment; Resource Allocation; PSM-DID; 
Firm Internationalization; China 









At the beginning of the 21st century, China put forward the development strategy of 
"Going out", after experiencing a stage of rapid development stimulated by import and export 
trade and utilization of foreign capital (Xu, Li, Jiang, & Chen, 2020). Not surprisingly, China 
has witnessed a rapid increase in the flows of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and 
the numbers of multinational enterprises (MNEs) since the introduction of this policy.1 
According to the 2019 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 
China's OFDI flow was 14.16 billion dollars, ranking second in the world, indicating that 
OFDI has gradually become an increasingly important way for China to be involved in the 
global economy. With China's Belt and Road initiatives further introduced, China's "Going 
out" strategy has turned into a new engine for pushing forward a new round of opening-up 
strategy. It is widely accepted that OFDI can play an important role in economic development 
(Murthy, 2015). OFDI is not only a key mode of internationalization, but also an important 
way for enterprises to make full use of domestic and foreign markets, in order to improve 
resource allocation. Therefore, we believe that it is pertinent and relevant to consider the 
impact of China's OFDI on resource allocation, thus contributing to the FDI literature.  
It has been documented that resource misallocation is often a fundamental issue for the 
Chinese economy (Dollar & Wei, 2007; Manova, Wei, & Zhang, 2015; Bai, Hsieh, & Song, 
2016). Some studies (e.g., Hsieh & Klenow, 2009; Wu, 2018) found that improving the 
efficiency of resource allocation can have great potential to promote China's economic 
growth. As a result, the issue of resource allocation has received much attention in the recent 
literature. Many existing studies have extensively examined the cause and consequence of 
resource misallocation from the perspectives of domestic market distortion and policy 
intervention in China. However, it seems that relatively few studies have investigated whether 
and how the internationalization of firms could contribute to improving the allocation 
efficiency. Related works have found that not only the value, but also the pattern of OFDI are 
indeed crucial factors to better understanding how and why China has become one of the most 
important emerging economies in the global market (Clegg, Lin, H., Voss, H., Yen, I., & Shih, 
Y., 2016). Against this background, this paper focuses on investigating whether and how 
different patterns of Chinese firms’ OFDI contribute to the improvement of internal resource 
allocation efficiency with our novel firm-level data. We find empirical evidence that the 
internationalization of firms’ OFDI and its patterns can provide an important role in 
improving resource misallocation in China. Thus, our study has key implications for both 
academics and policy makers. 
Our paper is grounded in two key strands of literature. The first strand of literature is 
related to resource misallocation. New and growing studies surveyed by Restuccia and 
Rogerson (2008) have highlighted that the efficiency of resource allocation is an important 
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factor in explaining total factor productivity (TFP) differences across countries. Thus, an 
efficient reallocation of resources across firms can strongly contribute to economic growth 
(Restuccia & Rogerson, 2008; Hsieh & Klenow, 2009; Wu, 2018). Many studies have 
discussed the misallocation across firms measured by the dispersion of TFP in line with the 
seminal work of Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Meanwhile, the crucial role of resource allocation 
within-firm has generally been overlooked to some extent. However, Bloom (2009) found that 
the resource allocation within-firm can be significant in determining macro-outcomes, such as 
business cycle fluctuation, TFP, and growth. The importance of resource allocation 
within-firm is also highlighted by Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2012), who examine 
endogenous product selection within-firm and point out that resource allocation within-firm 
may be more important than resource allocation across firms. A growing stream of studiesin 
the field of international trade, explores changes between different productive products 
within-firm, using disaggregated trade data in the context of different countries (see for 
example, Bernard et al., 2012 (USA); Goldberg et al., 2010 (India); Iacovone & Javorcik, 
2010 (Mexico); and Tan et al., 2015 (China)).  
There tends to be a lack of research that investigates resource allocation by considering 
investment changes between branches in the same firm (Matvos & Seru, 2011; Midrigan & 
Xu, 2014). In the context of China, Brandt et al. (2013) provide stylized facts of factor 
misallocation across time, space, and sector in China. Although there exist several studies that 
attempt to address resource misallocation existing in China, most of them focus only on 
domestic factors, government involvement, and specific policies (Tan et al., 2015; Deng & 
Wang, 2016; Chen, 2019; Cong et al., 2019). To the best of our knowledge, there seem to be 
very few existing studies which have directly considered the impact of China’s 
internationalization via OFDI on the internal resource allocation, especially from the 
micro-level perspective.  
The second strand of literature in our paper is OFDI from emerging economies (EEs). 
Commonly abbreviated as BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China), these emerging economies 
are increasingly important players in the global OFDI process, and they have recently 
attracted much attention from the economic literature (e.g., Kaushal, 2018; Mohanty & Sethi, 
2019). Many related studies (e.g., Nocke & Yeaple, 2007; Deng, 2009; Buckley et al., 2007; 
Wang et al., 2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012) have examined the patterns, motivations, and 
mode selections of EEs’ OFDI. Mainly due to the lack of OFDI in firm-level data, the 
research on the impact of OFDI on the domestic performance of EEs has received relatively 
little attention (Chen et al., 2012; Gerschewski, 2013). However, empirical evidence indicates 
that there is existing significant heterogeneity regarding firms’ participation in OFDI. 
Firm-level data does help to improve investigation on OFDI (Amighini et al., 2014). Recent 
studies, therefore, have put more efforts to conduct research based on firm-level data 




Stiebale & Trax, 2011; Cozza et al., 2015; Edamura et al., 2014) have found that the patterns 
of OFDI matter on the effect on the firms’ performance for EEs’ firms, in general, and, more 
specifically, Chinese companies. Hence, there is a need for more detailed information on 
firms’ OFDI data to better understand the effects of OFDI on resource allocation within-firm. 
Thanks to our unique dataset, we can discuss the impact of Chinese firms’ OFDI on internal 
resource allocation efficiency to distinguish the roles of different types of OFDI on firms’ 
allocation efficiency.  
This study aims to fill the existing research gaps by examining how OFDI affects 
resource allocation efficiency within-firm, and what are the heterogeneous impacts of Chinese 
firms’ OFDI via different patterns, imposed on the internal resource allocation efficiency of 
firms. Therefore, this paper helps to enhance our understanding of existing knowledge of 
Chinese resource allocation and enriches the field of research on the relationship between 
OFDI and firm’s performance in the context of China. Further, it also has some useful and 
relevant policy implications. It is well known that many OFDI enterprises tend to lack 
international experience despite the rapid growth of OFDI in China, which leads to the high 
failure rate and low profits of foreign investment of Chinese enterprises. A more challenging 
issue nowadays is that the world grapples with the effects of the COVID-19 global pandemic. 
According to the recent UNCTAD special edition of its investment trends monitor on March 8 
in 2020, COVID-19 could shrink global FDI by 5% to 15%, and new greenfield projects and 
M&As could result in a sharp slowdown. Therefore, our research on the enterprise level, 
deeply analyzing the impact of the specific OFDI behaviors of enterprises on the allocation of 
resources within enterprises, will provide key references for the specific strategy guiding the 
“Going out” of Chinese enterprises. In addition, our study provides a theoretical basis and 
rationale for the more efficient implementation of “Going out” policy for the Chinese 
government.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the data 
description, and the measures of resource allocation efficiency within-firm. In Section 3, we 
describe the identification method and the empirical model. Section 4 presents our 
heterogeneity and robust tests. Finally, we provide the key conclusions, policy 
recommendations, and limitations of the study.   
  
2. Data description and Measurements for within-firm resource allocation efficiency  
2.1 Data description 
Consistent with the objectives of our paper, we rely and focus on three types of 
databases:  
(1) Industrial Enterprise Database (IED): This firm-level production dataset is collected 
and maintained by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). It is a comprehensive 




non-state-owned enterprises with annual sales above five million renminbi in China between 
1998 and 2007. This dataset is currently widely used by Chinese and Western literature 
(Brandt et al., 2012), and is also considered to provide the most reliable data in China (Cai 
and Liu 2009). Following Feenstra et al. (2014), we first drop those firm-level observations 
for which the indexes of enterprise ID, total output, total assets, sales revenue, intermediate 
inputs, fixed assets, and the number of employees are partly missing, and drop those 
observations which violate generally accepted accounting standards. After excluding invalid 
samples, there are 556,492 enterprises and 1,976,281 total observations from 1998 to 2007.  
(2) Dataset of China Outward Foreign Investment Directory is provided by the Ministry 
of Commerce of China (hereinafter referred to as "Outbound Investment Directory"(OID)). It 
records the information of Chinese firms conducting OFDI and coversthe name of the parent 
company and its subsidiary, the country of destination, the year of approval of OFDI, and the 
scope of business. The Chinese government has not provided official OFDI statistics until 
2002 when NBSC and the former Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
jointly established China's first "Outbound Direct Investment Statistical System". In 
consideration of the reliability of the data and the consistency of the caliber, we limit the 
OFDI sample of this study to the companies that made their initial OFDI from 2002 to 2007. 
(3) The third and final dataset about OFDI mode in our paper is obtained based on 
manual data collection. The largest difficulty in this study is the data construction of OFDI 
mode (one of our key variables of interest), as the OID does not provide related information. 
In terms of data collection procedures, we collected the entry mode and the equity mode for 
firms’ OFDI through the parent companies’ websites, listed company annual reports and 
media public reports, etc. Specifically, the entry mode of firms’ subsidiaries is identified as 
"mergers and acquisitions" (M&A), if the message in the channels explicitly includes words, 
such as "mergers and acquisitions", "mergers", or "acquisitions". If the terms regarding the 
subsidiary company is expressed as "establish", "found", "build" or "newly established" in the 
information, it is regarded as "greenfield investment". In terms of equity modes, this is 
identified as "wholly-owned equity" (WOE), if the message clearly described the subsidiary 
as "wholly-owned equity". If the information is closely related to "joint venture equity"(JV), 
then it would be regarded as "joint venture subsidiary". When no relevant information is 
found, firm’s OFDI mode is treated as “missing” in our paper. 
In order to find out the firms which conduct OFDI during the sample period, we merged 
the first two datasets (i.e., IED and OID) by using the firms’ names, for which are the only 
item comparable between the two datasets. However, the Chinese names of enterprises in both 
datasets are often misleading due to typing errors, misreporting, and different abbreviations. 
The potential risks by matching its original parent names in both datasets are that we could 
not only lose many valuable sample firms, but some OFDI enterprises might be recognized as 




carefully deal with the original enterprises’ names in both datasets prior to matching them. 
After cleaning both datasets, the number of matched samples is increased by about 8.2% 
compared with the number of samples matched simply by using its original parent names. 
With this merged dataset and the mode dataset of firms’ OFDI, we obtain our estimation 
samples. The matching panel data from 2002-2007 contains 1,374 parent companies that 
conducted initial OFDI during this period, and 1,934 subsidiaries established by OFDI. The 
average numbers of destination countries where subsidiaries of each parent company locate 
are 1.11, with 10 the maximum number of countries. The initial OFDI destination of 902 
companies (about 65.6%) locates in developing countries, for another 431 companies (about 
31.4%) it locates in developed countries2. In addition, 41 companies (about 2.98%) had mixed 
destinations for investments (i.e., investment both in developed and developing countries). In 
terms of the initial OFDI during 2002-2007, there are 31 firms explicitly adopting the M&A 
mode, and 731 firms explicitly adopting the greenfield investment model. As for the equity 
mode, 631 companies adopt the WOE mode, and another 112 companies adopt JV mode. This 
unique dataset of OFDI mode enables our research to provide in-depth insights into the 
heterogeneous effects of OFDI on within-firm resource allocation efficiency. 
A new classification system for industry codes (GB/T 4754-2002) was adopted in 2003.  
Consistent with Brandt et al. (2012), we convert the industry codes in the 2003-2007 data to 
the old classification system to achieve consistency in the industry codes for the entire sample 
period (2001-2007).  
 
2.2 Resource allocation within-firm (RA) 
Following the ideas put forward by Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we consider an economy 
composed of many sectors that include many plants producing differentiated products, which 
could be combined into a sector aggregate accordingly. 







𝜎  (1) 
Where, Yij stands for the output of firm i in sector j and σ represents product 
substitution within sector.  










In the above C-D function, 𝐴𝑖𝑗  is total factor productivity; 𝐿𝑖𝑗 is the input of labor; 
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𝐾𝑖𝑗 is the input of capital; 𝛽𝑗
𝑙and 𝛽𝑗
𝑘 represent the output elasticity of labor and capital, 
respectively. Without the distortion of production factor, the marginal output of factor will be 
equal to the rate of return of each factor. However, as documented by Hsieh and Klenow 
(2009), the actual allocation may deviate from the efficient allocation when production factor 
is distorted. Therefore, factor distortion will drive wedges between marginal output of factor 
and its rate of factor return. 
A firm subjected to factor distortions will maximize its profit in the following formula: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥{𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑌𝑖𝑗 − (1 + 𝜏𝑙𝑖𝑗) 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝐿𝑖𝑗 − (1 + 𝜏𝑘𝑖𝑗) 𝑟𝐾𝑖𝑗} (3) 
 

























Where for firm i in sector j, 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑗 and 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐾𝑖𝑗 represent marginal revenue product 
of labor and capital, respectively. Pij is firm’s sale price; 𝑤𝑖𝑗 and r denote the return of units 
of labor and capital, respectively. 𝜏𝑙𝑖𝑗  and 𝜏𝑘𝑖𝑗   are wedges measuring deviations from 
efficient labor and capital allocation, respectively. Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we 
assume that the  r is 10% andσis 3. 
Misallocation can be inferred from differences between the marginal output value of 
various factors of production within or across firms. According to the expression in Eq. (4) 
and (5), we can yield 𝜏𝑙𝑖𝑗  and 𝜏𝑘𝑖𝑗. Whatever the reasons are for the wedges, an efficient 
firm will equate the marginal output value between each factor. Hence we can construct 
resource allocation index (RA1) to measure the efficiency of factor allocation within-firm as 
follows: 
 








According to the law of diminishing marginal returns of factor, when the marginal output 




reduce labor input and increase capital input to improve its profit, and vice versa. Therefore, 
RA1 could efficiently capture within-firm efficiency of resource allocation. The larger the 
value of RA1 is the less within-firm resource allocation efficiency would be.  
In addition, we could combine both factors’ distortion to construct another aggregated 




Therefore, RA2 indicator reflects the overall resource allocation efficiency of an 
enterprise, which consists of both labor distortion and capital distortion. The larger the value 
of 𝑅𝐴2 is the worse the performance of within-firm efficiency of resource allocation would 
be. 
   
2.3 Internal resource allocation efficiency of Chinese enterprises 
     In this section, we document stylized facts regarding within-firm resource allocation 
efficiency with whole samples, and separated samples of OFDI vs. non-OFDI firms. With the 
measures of within-firm resource allocation efficiency as RA1 and RA2, in the first place, we 
compute the internal resource allocation efficiency of Chinese enterprises from 2000 to 2007. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of overall performances among Chinese enterprises in 
within-firm resource allocation efficiency (RA1 and RA2), labor distortion (𝜏𝑙 ) and capital 
distortion (𝜏𝑘 ) for the whole samples and the subsamples of OFDI and non-OFDI. Statistics 
display that both the mean of RA1 and the mean of RA2 in Table 1 show an increasing trend 
from 2000 to 2007. Further, the average capital distortion is always larger than the absolute 
value of average labor distortion whether in the whole samples or in the OFDI and non-OFDI 
subsamples during this period. When we compare RA1 or RA2 in the two subgroups between 
OFDI and non-OFDI in Table 1, it shows that OFDI companies have relatively lower RA than 
those of non-OFDI companies, which indicates that firms’ OFDI may improve the efficiency 
of resource allocation within the enterprises. However, this conclusion needs to be further 
confirmed by the following rigorous empirical tests. 
 
Table 1: Statistics of enterprise resource allocation efficiency and factor distortion 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Whole  
Samples 
RA1 1.7976  1.9256  2.1693  2.4851  2.6851  2.4056  2.6590  2.8831  
RA2 0.0530  0.0622  0.0728  0.0901  0.1004  0.0845  0.0974  0.1069  
𝜏𝑙  -0.5271  -0.5221  -0.5172  -0.4978  -0.5037  -0.5100  -0.5326  -0.5508  
𝜏𝑘  0.9260  1.0900  1.2998  1.6302  1.8348  1.5412  1.8157  2.0273  
OFDI  
RA1 1.5651  1.8857  1.9072  2.0918  2.3195  1.7017  1.9508  2.1605  
RA2 0.0449  0.0614  0.0599  0.0729  0.0803  0.0495  0.0638  0.0729  
𝜏𝑙  -0.4729  -0.4685  -0.4936  -0.4680  -0.5096  -0.4887  -0.5037  -0.4892  





RA1 1.9001  1.9428  2.2828  2.6428  2.8374  2.6740  2.9536  3.1998  
RA2 0.0565  0.0625  0.0784  0.0971  0.1087  0.0979  0.1114  0.1217  
𝜏𝑙  -0.5510  -0.5453  -0.5274  -0.5098  -0.5012  -0.5182  -0.5446  -0.5778  
𝜏𝑘  0.9902  1.0754  1.3769  1.7694  1.9853  1.7990  2.1032  2.3310  
Source: Calculated by the authors 
 
3. Identification and empirical model 
3.1 PSM-DID method 
Our empirical strategy is to identify the causal effect of OFDI on firm’s RA. Let 𝑅𝐴𝑡,𝑖
1  
be the efficiency of resource allocation of OFDI of firm i in period t, while 𝑅𝐴𝑡,𝑖
0  denotes 
resource allocation efficiency of firm i in time period t if the firm does not conduct OFDI. The 
causal effect of OFDI of firm i on RA is then defined as: 
 
π = E(𝑅𝐴𝑡,𝑖
1 |𝑋𝑡−1,𝑖, 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡,𝑖 = 1) − E(𝑅𝐴𝑡,𝑖
0 |𝑋𝑡−1,𝑖, 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡,𝑖 = 1) 
(8) 
 
Where OFDIt,i is a dummy variable, taking the value of one if the firm’s initial OFDI 
occurs in the year t, zero otherwise; 𝑋𝑡−1,𝑖  contains a set of once-lagged control variables.  
The fundamental problem of the causal inference above is that the quantity RAt,i
0  is 
unobservable, as the firm i at time period t have initially conducted OFDI (i.e., for which we 
only observe RAt,i
1 ). Therefore, causal inference relies on the construction of the 
counterfactual for the second term in Eq. (8). An important feature of the accurate 
construction of the counterfactual is the selection of a valid control group. 
We employ matching techniques constructing control groups, which are expected to 
achieve matches of OFDI and non-OFDI firms that are similar to each other with respect to a 
range of observable characteristics. It is desirable to perform the matching on the basis of a 
single index that captures all the information from those variables. We adopt the method of 
propensity score matching as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Using probit model 
to identify the probability of OFDI conditional on a series of covariates observed before 
OFDI occurs. Then the unobservable second term in Eq. (8) can be matched from the 
corresponding non-OFDI firm with the closest scores, which is denoted as 
E(RAt,i
0 |Xt−1,i, OFDIt,i = 0). As our dataset is a panel, we can release the strong assumption 
of selection on observables by combining the matching technique with a 
difference-in-differences (DID) estimator (Blundell and Costa Dias 2000). Now, the causal 
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1  and ∆𝑅𝐴𝑡,𝑖




corresponding non-OFDI firm, respectively. 
  The choice of covariates is followed by the empirical literature on the determinants of 
firm’s OFDI. Existing literature suggests that the determinants of firm’s OFDI decision 
include TFP, capital intensity (KL), firm size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), firm profit (PROFIT), 
Export Intensity (EX), Financing Constraints (FINANCE), Ownership Structure (STATE) and 
Political Relations (AFFILIATION). Among the covariates mentioned above, TFP is 
measured by the LP method suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)3; Capital intensity (KL) 
is defined as the ratio of net fixed assets to the total number of employees of the firm. Our 
proxies of the size of the enterprise (SIZE) and the age of the enterprise (AGE) are the 
logarithm of the company's sales and the number of years of establishment of the enterprise, 
respectively. The profit of the enterprise (PROFIT) is defined as the ratio of the firm's 
operating profit to sales; the export intensity (EX) is measured as the share of the export 
delivery value to sale; Financing constraints (FINANCE) is defined as the ratio of interest 
expenses to fixed assets; Ownership structure (STATE) is measured by the ratio of 
state-owned paid-in capital to the total paid-in capital of the enterprise. As a measure of the 
degree of the political association (AFFILIATION), we adopt the method suggested by Wang 
et al. (2012), and based on the affiliation relationship of enterprise, from central, province, 
city, county, assign score from 5 to 1 accordingly. The greater the score is, the more intense 
the political connection would be. 
In this paper, we apply the nearest neighbor matching method to conduct year-by-year 
matching with the 1: 3 matching ratio. Thus, some companies could serve as control groups 
for multiple treatment groups. After the matching, we obtain 4,849 samples of treatment 
group and 11,849 samples of the control group. Figure 1 illustrates the identification strategy. 
It clearly shows that the two groups have generally similar trends before one year of the initial 
OFDI, but a visible divergence in trend of RA1 after then. It makes sense that the divergence 
may appear some periods ahead of initial OFDI as an individual firm’s behavior is likely to 
change in anticipation of its coming OFDI. Therefore, it would be a better choice to regard 
one year before OFDI as the effective starting point (solid vertical line in Figure 1) in order to 
find a proper treatment group. These similar trends in RA1 before -1 year between treatment 
group and control groups alleviate the concern that our treatment group and control groups 
are ex ante incomparable, which provides support to the satisfaction of our DID identifying 
assumption. Meanwhile, the treatment group is more efficient in allocating resources than the 
constructed control group after -1 year, which implies that OFDI can significantly improve 
within-firm efficiency of resource allocation. 
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Figure 1: control group vs. treatment group 
 
(Note: the initial year of firm’s OFDI is defined as the origin year 0 on horizontal line, then, 
-1 represents 1 year before OFDI occurs, -2 is 2 years before OFDI, however, +1 means 1 
year after the first OFDI happens, +2 is 2 years after the first OFDI happens, and so on. ) 
 
3.2 Estimation model and results 
3.2.1. Baseline model 
In order to examine the impact of OFDI on the efficiency of resource allocation within 
an enterprise, we adopt the following regression equation as our baseline specification: 
 
𝑅𝐴1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜃𝑝
+ 𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑡  
(10) 
 
Where, i、j、p and t respectively denote firm, industry, region and year. 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖 is a 
dummy variable, the value of 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖 is 1 for treatment group and 0 for control group; 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 
is control variables with once-lagged which include covariates we defined before; 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 is 
time dummy variable of OFDI, the value is 1 after -1 year of the initial OFDI, otherwise, the 
value is 0. The coefficient of the interaction item of 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖 and 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  (i.e. DID) reflects 
the impact of OFDI on the efficiency of resource allocation within the enterprise. 𝛿𝑡、𝜇𝑗 and 
𝜃𝑝 represent time dummy, industry dummy and region dummy, respectively, and 𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑡 refers 
to random error terms.  
 
3.2.2 Estimation and placebo test 
We firstly estimate the baseline specification (10), the result of which confirms our 
former conclusion that firm’s OFDI can improve internal resource allocation efficiency. The 
regression results for the baseline specification (10) are reported in Table 2. We start with a 
simple DID specification that includes only year, industry and region dummy in column (1) of 
Table 2. Our regressor of interest, 𝛽3, is negative and statistically significant, suggesting 




Evidently, our results are found to be robust to these additional controls. After that, we add the 
interaction items of OFDI and initial OFDI year (POST_1), OFDI and +1 year after OFDI 
(POST_2), OFDI and +2 years after OFDI (POST_3)4, and OFDI and +3 years after OFDI 
(POST_4) accordingly in the baseline model (10) to analyze the time dynamic effect of OFDI 
on the within-firm resource allocation efficiency, that is, whether the OFDI has a sustainable 
impact. The results without and with control variables are presented in column (3) and (4) of 
Table 2, respectively. As  can be seen in column (3) and (4), the coefficients of interaction 
items of OFDI and POST_1, OFDI and POST_2, OFDI and POST_3 are insignificant and 
negative; whereas the coefficients of the interaction OFDI and POST_4 is statistically 
significant and negative, suggesting that there is a lag effect of OFDI on the improvement of 
within-firm resources allocation efficiency. It is understandable as it always takes time for a 
firm to reorganize the production activities in reality. 
One issue is that our treatment and control groups could be systematically different ex 
ante, which may spuriously generate the impact of OFDI imposed on RA1. That is, the 
parallel trend hypothesis for DID identification is not satisfied. To alleviate this concern, we 
conduct placebo test. Based on the baseline model, we add both the interaction item of OFDI 
and OFDI one year before (OFDI*POST_pre1), and the interaction item of OFDI and OFDI 
two year before (OFDI*POST_pre2)5. We report the results in column (5) of Table 2. The 
coefficients of the interaction item of OFDI and OFDI one year before (OFDI*POST_pre1) 
and the interaction item of OFDI and OFDI two year before (OFDI*POST_pre2) are both 
found to be statistically insignificant, suggesting little expectation effect in much earlier years 
before a firm conducting OFDI and illustrating that improvement in efficiency of resource 
allocation is indeed due to the OFDI of enterprises. We further add to the interactive items of 
OFDI and 1 year after OFDI (POST_1), OFDI and 2 years after OFDI (POST_2), OFDI and 
three years after OFDI (POST_3) and OFDI and four years after OFDI (POST_4), and 
relevant results are presented in column (6) of Table 2. It indicates that the parallel trend 
hypothesis for DID identification is satisfied as the interaction items of OFDI with both one 
and two years before are still robustly insignificant.  
 
Table 2: Benchmark result analysis and placebo test 
 
Variables 
Baseline model Time dynamics Placebo test 
RA1 RA1 RA1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OFDI -0.3702** -0.4496*** -0.3687** -0.4485*** -0.4232*** -0.4219*** 
 (0.1460) (0.1376) (0.1461) (0.1377) (0.1564) (0.1564) 
                            
4 Based on our POSTt setting, one year after (POST_1) refers to the 0 initial year of OFDI. Two year after 
(POST_2) refers to +1 year of initial OFDI, and so on. 
5 
Based on our POST setting, one year before (POST_pre1), is equal to -2 year of initial OFDI. Two year 




POST 0.5647*** 0.5924*** 0.5587*** 0.5738*** 0.5993*** 0.5807*** 
 (0.1582) (0.1532) (0.1645) (0.1592) (0.1570) (0.1626) 
OFDI*POST -0.6837*** -0.6807*** -0.6584*** -0.5968*** -0.7071*** -0.6227*** 
 (0.1521) (0.1441) (0.1658) (0.1557) (0.1788) (0.1918) 
OFDI*POST_1   0.0544 0.0335  0.0324 
   (0.1647) (0.1624)  (0.1625) 
OFDI*POST _2   -0.0299 -0.1522  -0.1534 
   (0.1624) (0.1530)  (0.1530) 
OFDI*POST _3   -0.0836 -0.2355  -0.2366 
   (0.2054) (0.1915)  (0.1916) 
OFDI*POST _4   -0.7457*** -0.6458***  -0.6475*** 
   (0.2339) (0.2372)  (0.2371) 
OFDI*POST_pre1     0.0278 0.0279 
     (0.2028) (0.2029) 
OFDI*POST_pre2     -0.1529 -0.1542 
     (0.1590) (0.1590) 
Controls N Y N Y Y Y 
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 3.2414*** 1.6408* 3.2366*** 1.6276* 1.6328* 1.6194* 
 (0.6659) (0.8377) (0.6659) (0.8379) (0.8396) (0.8398) 
Observation 15,402 15,189 15,402 15,189 15,189 15,189 
R2 0.0939 0.1739 0.0940 0.1741 0.1739 0.1741 
Note: the robust standard error is clustered by firm. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01, same for all following 
tables  
 
3.2.3 Labor distortion and capital distortion 
 
As illustrated in section 2.2, RA2 is aggregated distortion index to measure resource 
allocation efficiency within-firm. We first replace the dependent variable in equation (10) 
with RA2. Then, we examine whether the effect of OFDI on improving the efficiency of 
enterprise resource allocation is mainly achieved through reducing labor distortion or capital 
distortion. To address this issue, we replace the explained variables in equation (10) with 
labor distortion （𝜏𝑙𝑖𝑗）and capital distortion （𝜏𝑘𝑖𝑗）,respectively. The results are presented 
in Table 3. Among them, the dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) are RA2, the 
dependent variables in columns (3) and columns (4) are labor distortions, and for columns (5) 
and (6), they are capital distortions. In addition, we only control the time, industry and region 
dummy in the odd columns, and further add all the control variables in the even columns. The 
coefficients of interaction terms of OFDI and POST are still significantly negative for RA2, 




terms of DID are negative, but not significant for 𝜏𝑙𝑖𝑗, while it is significantly negative for 
𝜏𝑘𝑖𝑗 , which demonstrates that the improvement of within-firm efficiency is mainly contributed 
by improving capital distortions rather than labor distortion. One possible explanation for this 
outcome is that capital misallocation is much more severe than labor market distortion in 
China. As we know, most loans in China are generally still dominated by state-owned banks 
(Zhang, Wang, Liu, & Fu, 2020). Thus, capital misallocation seems widespread due to 
government and policy intervention (Wu, 2018). It could help to ease capital misallocation 
when firms turn into international market via OFDI. However, compared to the inefficient 
financial market, the Chinese government began to reform labor market much earlier. China 
has experienced a massive labor migration since the mid-1990s, which might partly explain 
why OFDI has not the same effect on reducing labor distortion as on capital distortion.  
 
Table 3: Labor distortion and capital distortion 
 
Variables 
RA2 𝜏𝑙𝑖𝑗 𝜏𝑘𝑖𝑗 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OFDI -0.0232*** -0.0291*** -0.0276 -0.0660** -0.3807** -0.4788*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0077) (0.0318) (0.0307) (0.1511) (0.1425) 
POST 0.0318*** 0.0333*** 0.0240 0.0199 0.5070*** 0.5277*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0091) (0.0374) (0.0358) (0.1613) (0.1555) 
OFDI*POST -0.0322*** -0.0316*** -0.0022 -0.0054 -0.7055*** -0.6804*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0081) (0.0297) (0.0291) (0.1549) (0.1457) 
Controls N Y N Y N Y 
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.0762** -0.1133** -1.0040*** -2.1480*** 2.3899*** -0.0923 
 (0.0324) (0.0465) (0.0869) (0.1391) (0.6798) (0.8716) 
Observations 15,402 15,189 15,402 15,189 15,402 15,189 
R2 0.1158 0.1871 0.2814 0.3290 0.1434 0.2265 
 
4. Heterogeneous and robust test 
4.1 Heterogeneity test 
4.1.1. OFDI mode 
When undertaking OFDI in a foreign country, a firm can choose different modes of entry. 
Generally speaking, an investor may choose entry mode, either performing M&A with an 
existing firm or setting up a new venture (i.e. greenfield investment); or choose equity modes 
of ownership equity, such as WOE or JV6. In this section, we will examine how these 
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different modes of OFDI can impose an effect on within-firm resource allocation efficiency. 
There is often much missing information related to firms’ OFDI mode. Generally, the 
value of firms implementing international M&A or WOE tends to be greater, which are more 
likely to be reported by the media. We thus replace missing information about entry mode 
with greenfield investment and replace missing information about equity mode with JV in 
order to keep our samples as sufficient as possible. In robust test, we will take this issue into 
consideration again. The results of entry mode and equity mode are presented in column (1) 
and (2) of Table 4, respectively, as the decision of entry mode and equity mode is usually 
closely related. To avoid the possible ambiguous explanation of results coming from one 
dimension, we further combine entry mode and equity mode into four types of mode, which 
include Mode_1 (M&A - JV), Mode_2 (M&A - WOE); Mode_3 (greenfield - WOE) and 
Mode_4 (greenfield - JV). The results are presented in column (3) of Table 4, where Mode_2 
is treated as the reference group7. The regression results from Table 4 show that all the 
coefficients of DID are still negative and significant. However, the coefficients of three-way 
interaction items (OFDI*POST*Greenfield and OFDI*POST*WOE) are both insignificant in 
column (1) and column(2),which might imply that there is no significant heterogeneity in the 
effect of different entry modes or equity modes. However, when we consider both entry mode 
and equity mode, the coefficient of three-way interaction items of Mode_1 becomes negative 
and statistically significant in 5% level. This reflects that the entry mode with different equity 
choice does have heterogeneous effect on the resource allocation for a firm. More specifically, 
when we put the coefficient of the reference group (Mode_2) into overall consideration, those 
firms via M&A with JV (Mode_1) have a statistically better performance than those via M&A 
with WOE (Mode_2). Those firms with the mode choice of greenfield-WOE (Mode_3) might 
also perform better than firms with the mode of greenfield-JV (Mode_4), but it is not 
statistically significant. In other words, for firms conducting M&A, JV may be a better choice 
for ownership; however, for firms conducting greenfield, WOE may be a better choice for 
ownership according to our results.  
 
Table 4: Mode of OFDI 
 
 Entry mode Equity mode Entry & Equity mode  
 RA1 RA1 RA1 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
OFDI -0.4503*** -0.4512*** -0.4518*** 
 (0.0961) (0.0961) (0.0962) 
POST 0.2014 0.5621*** 0.5839*** 
 (0.2707) (0.1465) (0.1390) 
OFDI*POST -0.7677** -0.5823*** -0.7072** 
                                                                                
– JV from two dimensions of entry mode and equity mode.    
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 (0.3226) (0.1552) (0.3205) 
OFDI*POST*Greenfield 0.0885   
 (0.3224)   
OFDI*POST*WOE  -0.2291  
  (0.1800)  
OFDI*POST*Mode_1   -0.9272** 
   (0.3717) 
OFDI*POST*Mode_3   -0.0661 
   (0.3147) 
OFDI*POST*Mode_4   0.1210 
   (0.3178) 
Controls Y Y Y 
Year dummy Y Y Y 
Industry dummy Y Y Y 
Region dummy Y Y Y 
Constant 1.6085*** 1.6499*** 1.6281*** 
 (0.4929) (0.4931) (0.4935) 
Observations 15,189 15,189 15,189 
R-squared 0.1741 0.1740 0.1741 
 
 
4.1.2. Destination of OFDI 
 
It has been suggested by many studies that different destinations of OFDI, developed or 
developing countries, generate different impacts on the performance of home countries. Based 
on our data sample, many firms enter into more than one destination via OFDI. In this section, 
we investigate how OFDI of different destinations imposes influences on within-firm resource 
allocation efficiency. According to its destination, we category our samples into three types: 
developed countries, developing countries, and mixed. Relevant results are presented in Table 
5. Column (1) and (2) of Table 5 are the results of regression without and with the number of 
destinations, respectively. The evidence from the results in Table 5 shows that the coefficients 
of DID are still negative, but not significant now. However, the coefficients of three-way 
interaction items in Column (1) and (2) of Table 5 are negative in 5% significant level for 
developed destination. In contrast, the coefficients of three-way interaction term in Column (1) 
and (2) of Table 5 are negative but not significant for developing destination. These results 
indicate that there do exist significant heterogeneous effect on internal efficiency gain from 
the different choice of destination, and those firms investing into developed destinations (also 
for firms investing into mixed destinations, which are treated as a reference group) can play 
better performance on internal efficiency improvement than only investing into developing 
destinations. These results are consistent with previous research findings that Chinese firms 





Table 5: Destination country of OFDI 
   





OFDI -0.4468***  -0.4462*** 
 (0.0965) (0.0967) 
POST -0.2185 -0.2372 
 (0.2754) (0.2951) 
OFDI*POST*Developed -0.7870** -0.7855** 
 (0.3665) (0.3665) 
OFDI*POST*Developing -0.5541 -0.5523 
 (0.3564) (0.3559) 
OFDI*POST -0.0438 -0.0456 
 (0.3473) (0.3474) 
Number of destinations  0.0146 
  (0.0880) 
Controls Y Y 
Year dummy Y Y 
Industry dummy Y Y 
Region dummy Y Y 
Constant 1.5220*** 1.5107*** 
 (0.4998) (0.5066) 
Observations 15,066 15,066 
R-squared 0.1758 0.1758 
 
 
4.1.3. Branch types of OFDI 
 
According to OID provided by the Ministry of Commerce of China, there are different 
branch types of OFDI. Jiang and Jiang (2014) found that different branch types of OFDI can 
have different impacts on the performance of parent companies. It is commonly classified by 
four branch types of OFDI: “representative office” (Type_1), “trade” (Type_2), “R&D” 
(Type_3), and “trade + R&D” (Type_4). Following the approach generally applied in a 
Chinese study (Jiang and Jiang 2014), we distinguish between the different types of OFDI 
based on the keywords involved in the information of business scope from OID. More 
specifically, we consider the OFDI firms as Type_1, when description of business scope of 
OFDI firm only includes keywords, such as service, representative office, consulting, 
non-operating management, leasing, investment management, and investment consulting, etc. 
In China, the major purpose of setting up “representative office” in foreign countries is often 




firms as Type_2, when description only covers keywords, such as trade, sales, import and 
export, purchase and sale, retail, and wholesale etc. Meanwhile, those firms with keywords 
that only include development, scientific research, research and design, etc. are defined as 
Type_3. If description in the business investment scope of the enterprise both includes the 
keywords in Type_2 and Type_3, we define these firms as Type_4. The estimation results of 
four types of OFDI are reported in Table 6, where Type_3 of OFDI is treated as a reference 
group8. From Table 6, we can see that the coefficient of DID becomes insignificant, but all 
coefficients of three-way interaction items (OFDI*POST*Type_1, OFDI*POST*Type_2 and 
OFDI*POST*Type_4) are becoming very significant. That is, firms with branches of Type_1, 
Type_2 and Type_4 can induce the efficiency improvement within-firm except those with 
pure R&D branch. This is consistent with previous research in terms of export contributions 
to improving the efficiency of resource allocation of enterprises (Metliz, 2003; Bernard et al., 
2011; Qiu & Zhou, 2013; Mayer et al., 2014). As branches of Type_1, Type_2 and Type_4 are 
all related to trade, they would be, thus, beneficial for the improvement of within-firm 
resource allocation efficiency by promoting exports. As for the result of firms with only pure 
R&D branch abroad, we conjecture that the resource allocation may be affected due to its 
strategic motivation or its different objectives.  
 






OFDI -0.3479*** -0.4304*** 
 (0.1051) (0.1005) 
POST 0.2900 0.3075 
 (0.2082) (0.1999) 
OFDI*POST 0.3260 0.3166 
 (0.3992) (0.3882) 
OFDI*POST*Type_1 -1.3826*** -1.3104*** 
 (0.4261) (0.4109) 
OFDI*POST*Type_2 -1.0786** -1.0471** 
 (0.4263) (0.4147) 
OFDI*POST*Type_4 -0.9855** -1.0184** 
 (0.4144) (0.4027) 
Controls N Y 
Year dummy Y Y 
Industry dummy Y Y 
Region dummy Y Y 
Constant 3.2047*** 1.6450*** 
                            
8
 As the share of firms with branches of Type_3 is less than 10 percent of the total sample, what more, other three 




 (0.4006) (0.5302) 
Observations 14,617 14,415 
R-squared 0.0955 0.1771 
 
4.2 Robust tests 
To provide further support on the validity of our specification, we conduct several 
robustness checks. 
First, we change the matching ratio. More specifically, we replace the matching ratio of 1: 
3 with 1: 1, and re-estimate the baseline regression. The regression results are presented in 
column (1) of Table 7. The estimated result obtained is consistent with the evidence presented 
in the previous baseline regression results.  
Second, we change the method for calculating the output elasticity of factor. Here, we 
replace LP method with OP method as proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). We recalculate 
RA1 and RA2 with the new output elasticity of factor, and repeat the baseline regression. We 
report the corresponding results of the regression in columns (2) and (3) of Table 7. The 
results remain similar. 
Third, we drop missing samples of mode. It may be of concern that we treat those 
samples without entry mode information as greenfield and treat those samples without equity 
mode information as JV in previous Section 4.1.1 may bias our results. To mitigate this 
concern, we restrict the sample to firms that have explicit information of both entry and 
equity mode, and conduct regression again. The regression results are presented in columns (4) 
of Table 7. The coefficient of DID is still negative and statistically significant, and the 
coefficients for three-way interaction terms of Mode_1 and Mode_3 keep negative the same 
as the previous results. Therefore, we may conclude that those firms with M&A entry mode, 
JV equity may be a better ownership choice than WOE, but we still need to be more cautious 
about this conclusion, as now the coefficient for three-way interaction term is becoming 
statistically insignificant.  
Finally, we consider change in rental price. It may be problematic that our results could 
be sensitive to the assumption of rental price ( r ) and product substitution elasticity(σ) in our 
measures of RA. To consider this, we change the way to calculate r but still keepσas 39. We 
calculate the rental price by firm’s interest expenditure over its debt10 rather than assuming 
10%. Based on new rental price r, we obtain our new RA1. Then, we estimate the baseline 
model with the change of RA1. As it is showed in column (5) for Table 7, our finding is still 
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 The reason is that σ is generally between 3 to 10 in competitive manufacturing according to Broda and Weinstein 
(2006), Hendel and Nevo (2006). In addition, the market can become more efficient with σ increase (Gong & Hu, 
2013), and firms can improve the efficiency of resource allocation with more efficient market. Thus, take a low 
bound 3 for σ is the most conservative choice.  
10
 From 1999 to 2007, the legal minimum interest rate of financial institution’ loan was set above 5% in China. 
Therefore, following the way suggested by Shi and Xian (2012), the rental price, which is less than 5%, will be 




robust with new RA1.   
 




OP method  
for RA 
Drop missing 
samples for mode 
Change  
of r 
Variables RA1 RA1_OP RA2_OP RA1 RA1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OFDI -0.4074** -0.2106** -0.0130*** -0.5060*** -0.8199*** 
 (0.1847) (0.0838) (0.0043) (0.1379) (0.2714) 
POST 0.5470** 0.2487*** 0.0117** 0.4096** 1.0840*** 
 (0.2177) (0.0958) (0.0052) (0.2039) (0.3006) 
OFDI*POST -0.6666*** -0.4243*** -0.0151*** -0.6778** -1.2230*** 
 (0.1991) (0.0921) (0.0043) (0.3411) (0.2790) 
OFDI*POST*Mode_1    -0.6360  
    (0.4086)  
OFDI*POST*Mode_3    -0.0515  
    (0.3191)  
OFDI*POST*Mode_4    -0.4085  
    (0.3412)  
Constant 1.9527* 0.9744* -0.1320*** 1.8547** 2.8060* 
 (1.0103) (0.5034) (0.0234) (0.8414) (1.6044) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry dummy Y Y Y Y Y 
Region dummy Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 8,050 15,189 15,189 7,526 15,157 
R-squared 0.1683 0.1220 0.1659 0.1890 0.1791 
 
 
5. Conclusions, policy recommendations and limitations           
  
Empirical evidence on the effect of firms’ internationalization on resource allocation is 
relatively scarce, particularly in terms of the internationalization process of OFDI. This is one 
of the first empirical papers that explores the impact of enterprises' OFDI behavior on the 
efficiency of resource allocation within-firm by adopting PSM-DID method and using 
firm-level data of China. Our results show that China's OFDI can significantly improve the 
overall efficiency of resource allocation within enterprises, which has a time lag effect. 
Furthermore, we find that different patterns of firms’ OFDI display significant heterogeneity 
in their performances. More specifically, those firms conducting M&A entry mode with the 
ownership of JV, in general, perform the best in our paper. Firms investing into developed 
destinations or mixed destinations (both developed and developing destinations) can perform 




destinations. When OFDI is categorized by its branch types, we find those firms which set up 
the types of branch related with trade, such as representative office, trading or trade plus R&D, 
are more likely to have better internal resources allocation efficiency gains. Our regression 
results also provide empirical evidence that the improvement of the efficiency of the internal 
resource allocation by Chinese OFDI is mainly achieved by alleviating the capital distortion 
of enterprises.  
Our study provides several key policy implications. First, we suggest that the Chinese 
government is well advised to create a better environment to encourage competent and 
promising enterprises to invest abroad. In addition, we recommend Chinese enterprises 
leveraging the attractive opportunities of “one belt, one road”, thus actively benefiting from 
the advantages of OFDI to improve the efficiency of internal resource allocation. Secondly, as 
different modes, destinations, and branch types of OFDI can generate different effect on 
internal resource allocation, Chinese enterprises should make thoroughly considerations on 
the choice of modes, destinations, and branch types of OFDI according to their actual 
conditions, in order to avoid following others blindly and achieving the intended purposes of 
OFDI. 
One main limitation of our study relates to the timeframe of the paper in that our sample 
is restricted to 2007. The intermediate input data from the Chinese Industrial Enterprise 
Database has not been publicly available since 2007. Therefore, it is impossible for us to 
calculate the output elasticity of labor and capital (𝛽𝑗
𝑙 and 𝛽𝑗
𝑘 accordingly), which are the 
necessary parameters to measure our key variable of RA. However, the purpose of this paper 
focuses on exploring the role of the firms’ OFDI behavior on the improvement of internal 
resource allocation, rather than solving a specific problem in the current OFDI. China's OFDI 
has developed very rapidly in the past decades. It would be beneficial to be able to explain the 
reality with more recent data. Thus, we believe that this provides potential scope for future 
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